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A recurring theme in arguments from the poverty of the stimulus con-
cerns children’s knowledge of linguistic structure. Nativists point to
the extensive gap between what children know and what they could
have learned from experience, even given optimistic assumptions
about children’s abilities to extract information from the environment,
and to form generalizations. This squib looks at children’s knowledge
of linguistic structures that involve the semantic property of downward
entailment, allowing us to address a recent critique of children’s
knowledge of structure offered by Lewis and Elman (2002).
1 Structure Dependence and Poverty of the Stimulus
An example of structure-dependent linguistic principles deals with
question formation. This phenomenon was originally described by
Chomsky (1971), who questioned the extent to which the primary
linguistic data could lead children to form the correct generalizations
relating declarative sentences and their yes/no question counterparts
(see also Chomsky 1980 and discussion in Piattelli-Palmarini 1980).
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Consider the declarative sentences in (1) and the corresponding yes/
no questions in (2).
(1) a. The boy who is sitting on the rug is hungry.
b. The boy is sitting on the rug that is being vacuumed by
his mother.
(2) a. Is the boy who is sitting on the rug hungry?
b. Is the boy sitting on the rug that is being vac-
uumed by his mother?
Even these simple examples suffice to illustrate that structure-blind
operations will have a difficult time accounting for question formation
in English.
The role of structure dependence in question formation by chil-
dren was investigated by Crain and Nakayama (1987), who used an
elicited-production task in several experiments to evoke yes/no ques-
tions from young children. In one experimental trial, children were
shown a picture depicting one man who was beating a donkey and a
second man who was not beating a donkey. Then children were invited
to pose a question to a puppet, Jabba the Hutt. The input to children
contained two auxiliary verbs: for example, Ask Jabba if the man who
is beating the donkey is mean. The experiment was designed to see
whether children would ask adultlike questions like (3) or whether,
instead, they would ask incorrect questions like (4), where the first
auxiliary verb was ‘‘moved’’ from its position in the request they had
just heard.
(3) Is the man who is beating the donkey mean?
(4) *Is the man who beating the donkey is mean?
Observing that no child ever produced questions like (4), Crain and
Nakayama (1987) concluded that children entertain structure-depen-
dent operations in forming yes/no questions, not structure-independent
ones, despite the lack of overt evidence in the input.
This conclusion was recently challenged on two counts. Pullum
and Scholz (2002) argue that Crain and Nakayama (1987) make the
unwarranted assumption that children cannot rely on the input in order
to learn the correct question forms. They contend that there is sufficient
available evidence to support learning (but see Crain and Pietroski
2002, Lasnik and Uriagereka 2002, Yang 2003). Taking a different
tack, Lewis and Elman (2002) constructed a simple recurrent network
to model question formation in English. The network was trained in
a three-stage process, such that the degree of complexity of the input
was increased at each stage. The network was presented with yes/no
questions with a single auxiliary verb (e.g., Is the big dog in the car
scary?), but not ones with two auxiliaries (e.g., Is the farmer who is
beating the donkey mean?). Lewis and Elman (2002:364) maintain
that ‘‘the network does not make the predictions corresponding to
the ungrammatical [question, such as (4)]—i.e., the network does not
predict [a gerund] following ‘who’.’’ In other words, the network con-
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sistently predicts that a substring like (5) should be followed by an
auxiliary verb, despite the absence of such strings in the training ses-
sions.
(5) Is the boy who
Lewis and Elman (2002) observe, further, that if the network is pre-
sented with a substring with an auxiliary verb following who, as in
(6), it predicts the occurrence of a third auxiliary, thereby modeling
the kind of ungrammatical questions that children produced in Crain
and Nakayama’s study (e.g., Is the man who is beating his donkey is
mean?).
(6) Is the boy who is smoking
Lewis and Elman (2002:368–369) remark that ‘‘the most prominent
and persistent of the errors is the prediction of an auxiliary following
the participle, i.e., ‘is the boy who is smoking is’ ’’—so the network
models the kind of ungrammatical questions reported by Crain and
Nakayama.
Despite these claims, it is hard to see what the network really
learned. We gather that one thing the network learned is that a sequence
like who smoking is unacceptable whereas who is smoking is accept-
able. This is not a desirable result, however, since questions like (7)
are well formed despite the occurrence of the sequence of words who
smoking.
(7) Is the boy who smoking offends still here?
Furthermore, it is misleading to claim that the network models chil-
dren’s mistakes documented by Crain and Nakayama (1987). These
researchers indeed collected sentences containing three occurrences
of is. However, they concluded that those forms could not be used to
distinguish between the application of a structure-dependent rule and
the application of a structure-independent one. Therefore, they modi-
fied the experimental protocol in a follow-up study, in order to elicit
questions containing an auxiliary like be and a modal like can. Parsi-
mony suggests that Lewis and Elman should have implemented the
same maneuver. For example, they should have investigated the net-
work predictions for sequences with an auxiliary like be and a modal
like can, as in (8).
(8) Can the boy who is smoking
Finally, Lewis and Elman need to explain how the same abstract notion
underlies several different linguistic phenomena. Assuming that the
results they have documented show that a neural network can model
question formation, it still remains to be shown that the same network
would converge on any principle that is also relevant for other linguis-
tic phenomena. After all, no one has ever suggested that structure
dependence is construction specific. Indeed, there is abundant empiri-
cal evidence that children apply structure-dependent operations across
different linguistic phenomena, as we will now demonstrate.
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2 Structure Dependence and Downward Entailment
Structure dependence figures prominently in several linguistic phe-
nomena that involve the semantic property of downward entailment
(see Ladusaw 1979). Consider the examples in (9)–(11). The sentences
in (9) show that negation only licenses inferences from a set to its
subsets for NPs in its c-command domain. The same contrast holds
for the licensing of several negative polarity items (NPIs), as shown
in (10); and it is crucial for the interpretation of the disjunction operator
or, which receives a conjunctive interpretation when it is in the scope
of negation, as shown in (11), as in one (direction of one) of De
Morgan’s laws.
(9) a. The boy who majored in linguistics did not learn a Ro-
mance language.
⇒ The boy who majored in linguistics did not learn
French.
b. The boy who did not major in linguistics learned a Ro-
mance language.
*⇒ The boy who did not major in linguistics learned
French.
(10) a. The boy who majored in linguistics did not learn any
Romance language.
b. *The boy who did not major in linguistics learned any
Romance language.
(11) a. The boy who majored in linguistics did not learn French
or Spanish.
⇒ The boy who majored in linguistics did not learn
French and the boy who majored in linguistics did
not learn Spanish.
b. The boy who did not major in linguistics learned French
or Spanish.
*⇒ The boy who did not major in linguistics learned
French and the boy who did not major in linguistics
learned Spanish.1
The role of c-command in constraining children’s assignment of
the conjunctive interpretation to the disjunction operator or was studied
1 Higginbotham (1991) refers to the phenomenon illustrated in (11) as the
‘‘conjunctive’’ interpretation of disjunction. We will adopt Higginbotham’s
terminology for convenience. However, it should be clear that, strictly speaking,
the interpretation of the disjunction or is simply the inclusive-or interpretation,
proposed by classical logic (see Horn 1989). In other words, the meaning of
or is not different in downward- and upward-entailing environments. Possible
differences in the entailment patterns originate from the interaction between
or and other operators. A more accurate, though less reader-friendly, way of
capturing the scheme in (11) would be to say that sentences containing disjunc-
tion in the scope of a downward-entailing operator entail the validity of the
sentences in which the same operator has scope over one of the disjuncts (i.e.,
OPDE(A or B) entails OPDE(A) as well as OPDE(B)).
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by Crain et al. (2002), who investigated whether the structure-depen-
dent notion of c-command constrains downward entailment in child
language, using a truth-value judgment task. The aim was to see if
4- and 5-year-olds know that the relevant operator must c-command
disjunction to license the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction, as
in (11a), while linear precedence does not suffice, as in (11b). The
experiment employed the prediction mode.2
In one trial of Crain et al.’s study, children were told a story
about two girls who had each lost a tooth. The girls knew that the
Tooth Fairy would come during the night to reward them, in exchange
for their lost tooth. One girl decided to go to bed right away, while
the other girl decided to stay up late to see what the Tooth Fairy looked
like. Then, the Tooth Fairy arrived, with two jewels and two dimes.
At this point, the story was interrupted so that a puppet, Merlin the
Magician, could make a prediction about what would happen in the
remainder of the story. One group of children heard (12), in which
negation both precedes and c-commands the disjunction operator or,
while the second group heard (13), in which negation precedes but
does not c-command or.
(12) The girl who stayed up late will not get a dime or a jewel.
(13) The girl who didn’t go to sleep will get a dime or a jewel.
At this point, the story was resumed. As events ensued, the Tooth
Fairy gave a dime and a jewel to the girl who was sleeping, but the
Tooth Fairy was disappointed to see that the other girl was still awake.
The little girl explained that she had decided to stay up to see what
the Tooth Fairy looked like. Then, the Tooth Fairy decided to give
this girl a jewel, but not a dime. Following the completion of the story,
Merlin reminded the child subjects of his prediction:
(14) I said that the girl who stayed up late would not get a dime
or a jewel.
(15) I said that the girl who didn’t go to sleep would get a dime
or a jewel.
Because of the interaction between downward entailment and c-com-
mand, the two sentences generate different entailment patterns. In par-
ticular, only (12) licenses the conjunctive interpretation, which re-
quires that the girl under consideration did not get a dime and that
she did not get a jewel. By contrast, (13) is true in the context set up
by the story. The finding was that children rejected sentences like (12)
92% of the time, but they accepted ones like (13) 87% of the time.
Thus, the findings indicate that children distinguish between the entail-
ment patterns associated with or in the two sentences.
2 This choice was dictated by the desire to avoid the infelicity of using
the scalar term or in a context that warranted the computation of scalar implica-
tures (see Chierchia et al. 1998).
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The findings documented by Crain et al. (2002) show that linear
precedence is not a sufficient condition to establish a downward-entail-
ing environment. That said, we decided to extend Crain et al.’s study
to address a potential confound. In that study, the two test sentences
differed in the number of words that intervened between negation and
disjunction: these operators were closer in (12) than in (13). If linear
precedence is a domain-general cue that children pay attention to, it
is possible that ‘‘distance’’ played a role in children’s interpretation.
3 Experimental Design
To investigate the role of linear distance in child grammar, we con-
ducted two experiments employing the truth-value judgment task
(Crain and McKee 1985, Crain and Thornton 1998). In Experiment I,
children were presented with sentences in which the disjunction opera-
tor or was preceded and c-commanded by negation, but these two
operators were further from each other than in the corresponding condi-
tion in Crain et al.’s study. In Experiment II, children were presented
with sentences in which the disjunction operator or was preceded but
not c-commanded by negation, and these two operators were closer
to each other than in the corresponding condition in Crain et al.’s
study.
3.1 Experiment I
Experiment I was designed to determine whether children’s interpreta-
tion of disjunction in the scope of negation was affected by the distance
between the two operators. Recall that c-command was confounded
with proximity in Crain et al.’s study. To rectify this, we conducted
an experiment in which the structural relations were not altered, but
the distance between negation and disjunction was manipulated in the
target sentences. To minimize the differences between our study and
Crain et al.’s, we used the prediction mode of the truth-value judgment
task, as Crain et al. did. Thirty children participated in the experiment.
The children ranged in age between 3;08 and 6;05, with a mean age
of 4;09. Each child was presented with two target trials, one warm-
up, and one filler trial. One of the target trials is described in (16).
(16) ‘‘This is a story about Winnie the Pooh, Eeyore, and Arthur.
Eeyore is very sad, and Winnie the Pooh says, ‘You need
something to cheer you up. Let’s go to Arthur’s. He always
has lots of good food!’ When they arrive at Arthur’s store,
Arthur shows them some goodies: a strawberry, a cookie,
and a cake.’’
At this point, the storyteller interrupted the story to ask Merlin the
Magician to predict what would happen next. Merlin made the follow-
ing prediction:
(17) I know what will happen. Winnie the Pooh will not let
Eeyore eat the cookie or the cake.
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Then the story resumed, as in (18).
(18) ‘‘Winnie the Pooh invites Eeyore to eat the strawberry be-
cause it is very healthy, but Eeyore says, ‘Well, I know that
the strawberry is very healthy, but I really need something
sweet,’ to which Winnie the Pooh responds, ‘OK, you can
have the cookie then, but not the cake, because that’s too
much sugar for you!’ ’’
Following the completion of the story, Merlin reminded the child of
his prediction.
(19) I said that Winnie the Pooh would not let Eeyore eat the
cookie or the cake.
Let us spell out our predictions. Negation precedes and c-com-
mands disjunction in (19). Thus, the preferred reading of the target
sentence, for adults, is that Winnie the Pooh would not let Eeyore eat
the cookie and he would not let Eeyore eat the cake. This interpretation
makes the sentence false, because Winnie the Pooh did allow Eeyore
to eat the cookie.3 In short, the conjunctive interpretation of disjunction
arises despite the linguistic material intervening between negation and
disjunction.
Against this background, recall that children’s behavior docu-
mented by Crain et al. (2002) could have been dictated by the distance
between negation and disjunction. If so, children could fail to assign
the conjunctive interpretation to the disjunction operator or in the
present study; then, they would accept the target sentences. By con-
trast, if children’s interpretation was governed by structural relations
between not and or, they should reject the target sentences, without
regard to the distance between the two logical operators. This is exactly
what happened. The child subjects rejected the target sentence on 51
out of 60 trials (85%). As controls, a group of 10 undergraduates
participated in a videotaped version of the experiment. This control
group rejected the target sentences 95% of the time.
These findings show that c-command is a sufficient condition for
the application of the familiar entailment pattern. When disjunction is
c-commanded by a downward-entailing operator like negation, chil-
dren, like adults, apply the relevant De Morgan’s law, regardless of
the distance between the logical operators. Moreover, children as-
signed the conjunctive interpretation to disjunction in our experiment
to the same extent as in Crain et al.’s (2002) experiment, despite the
difference in distance between the two operators in the sentences em-
3 As in Crain et al.’s study, we controlled for the order of the disjunct
that made the sentence false. In other words, in one trial the target sentence
was false because the sentence containing the first disjunct was false, as in the
story just described, and in the other trial, the sentence was false because the
sentence containing the second disjunct was false.
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ployed in the two experiments (see (17) and (12)).4 Thus, the relative
proximity of negation and disjunction is not necessary for the conjunc-
tive interpretation of disjunction. To determine whether it is a sufficient
condition, we turn to the next experiment.
3.2 Experiment II
Experiment II was designed to determine whether children in Crain
et al.’s (2002) study refrained from assigning the conjunctive interpre-
tation of disjunction (in the relevant condition) because of the words
that intervened between the two operators in that study. Crain et al.
report that children did not assign a conjunctive interpretation to the
disjunction operator or when interpreting (13), thereby showing that
linear precedence by negation alone did not license such an interpreta-
tion in child grammars. Notice, however, that there is considerable
distance between negation and disjunction in (13). In particular, the
distance between the two logical operators is greater than that in the
target sentences used by Crain et al. in the c-command condition (see
(12)). Hence, the possibility arises that children did not assign a con-
junctive interpretation to disjunction in (13) because the relevant oper-
ators were further apart in (13) than in (12).
To investigate this possibility, children were presented with sen-
tences in which negation and disjunction occurred at the same distance
as in (12), but negation did not c-command disjunction. As in Crain
et al.’s study, the experiment employed the prediction mode of the
truth-value judgment task. Thirty-five children participated in the ex-
periment. The children ranged in age between 3;05 and 6;05, with a
mean age of 4;11. Each child was presented with two target trials, one
warm-up, and one filler trial. Here is the protocol of one of the target
trials:
(20) ‘‘This is a story about a Karate Man and two Pooh Bears,
one very big and the other smaller. The Karate Man has just
finished his training and is about to eat his after-training
snack: some honey, a doughnut, and a strawberry. When
the Pooh Bears arrive, the Karate Man starts bragging about
how strong he is and says, ‘I bet I am so strong that I can
lift each one of you! In fact, I promise that I will give some
of my food to whoever I cannot lift.’ The Pooh Bears accept
the bet and the small Pooh Bear walks in front of the Karate
Man. The Karate Man looks at him and easily lifts him.
Then, the Karate Man looks at the bigger Pooh Bear and
says, ‘Hmm, this is going to be tough. Maybe I made a
mistake. Well, let’s see.’ He tries to lift the Pooh Bear but
he fails. He walks around the Pooh Bear and looks for an
easier grip but he fails again. At this point he says, ‘Well,
4 Recall that children in Crain et al.’s (2002) study rejected sentences like
The girl who stayed up late will not get a dime or a jewel 92% of the time.
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it looks like I lost my bet with you, big Pooh Bear. Now I
have to give you some of my food!’ ’’
As in Experiment I, the storyteller stopped at this point in the story
to ask Merlin the Magician to guess what would happen next. Merlin
made the following prediction:
(21) I know. The Karate Man will give the Pooh Bear he cannot
lift the honey or the doughnut.
Then the story resumed.
(22) ‘‘The Karate Man looks at his food and says, ‘Maybe I
should give him some honey because I know that’s what
bears like, but I am sure he already had some honey today.
Well, I could give him the doughnut, then, but I will keep
the strawberry because that’s what makes me strong!’ and
gives the big Pooh Bear the doughnut.’’
At this point, Merlin reminded the child of the prediction he had made.
(23) I said that the Karate Man would give the Pooh Bear he
could not lift the honey or the doughnut.
Notice first that the substring of (23) . . . he could not lift the honey
or the doughnut is composed of local construction types that permit
the conjunctive reading of the disjunction operator or. Thus, if children
encode linguistic expressions like this into construction types, they
might be expected to assign the conjunctive interpretation to or in
such sentences (see Crain and Pietroski 2002:174). However, if chil-
dren assign a structural representation to such sentences, this will en-
sure that negation does not c-command the disjunction operator, so
the conjunctive interpretation will not be possible. In addition, notice
that negation and disjunction are closer to each other in the target
sentences in the present study than in Crain et al.’s study. If proximity
were a sufficient condition for assigning a conjunctive interpretation
to disjunction, then children should resort to such an interpretation in
response to the test sentences, such as (23). On this scenario, children
should assign the conjunctive interpretation to disjunction in (23), and
reject it, on the grounds that the Karate Man had not given the honey
to the Pooh Bear that he had not been able to lift. By contrast, if
children take into account the structural relationship between the two
operators, the absence of intervening words should be irrelevant to
their interpretation of disjunction. If so, the conjunctive interpretation
of disjunction will not be assigned, since negation fails to c-command
the disjunction operator, regardless of linear distance or the local well-
formedness of the sequence of words.5
5 As in Crain et al.’s study, on half of the trials, only the first disjunct
needed to be parsed in order for subjects to decide the truth or falsity of the
test sentences. However, on half of the trials, the truth or falsity of the sentence
could only be decided if subjects parsed the entire disjunction, since the second
disjunct was crucial for deciding the truth of the test sentences.
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This is exactly what happened. The children who participated in
the experiment accepted the target sentences on 56 out of 70 trials
(80%).6 A group of 12 undergraduates participated as controls; they
always accepted the target sentences. Thus, children did not assign
the conjunctive interpretation to the disjunction operator or, despite
the proximity between negation and disjunction, and despite the simi-
larity of the local construction types to other linguistic expressions for
which the conjunctive interpretation is imposed. Moreover, children
refrained from assigning the conjunctive interpretation to the disjunc-
tion operator or to the same extent for the target sentences of our
experiment and for the target sentences used by Crain et al. (2002),
even though the distance between negation and disjunction differs in
the two sentences (see (23) and (13)).7 This shows that proximity
between these two operators is not relevant for children’s interpretation
of disjunction; structure is what matters for children.
4 Conclusion
This squib focused on structure dependence in child language. We
reviewed the findings of an experiment by Crain et al. (2002). We
noted a possible confound in that study, and we eliminated the con-
found in two follow-up experiments. These experiments investigated
children’s knowledge of the interaction between downward entailment
and the structure-dependent notion of c-command. The experimental
results corroborate the findings of previous research and resist explana-
tion by accounts that do not attribute knowledge of structure-dependent
principles to young children. The semantic property of downward en-
tailment was used in these experiments to test children’s adherence to
structure dependence by considering how children interpret sentences
that do not differ in the possibility of occurring in their environment
(see Pullum and Scholz 2002). The findings show that children, just
like adults, do not assign scope using a structure-independent notion
such as linear precedence (see also Lidz and Musolino 2002). The
findings are consistent with the view that children base their interpreta-
tion of sentences on abstract syntactic properties and do not entertain
the kind of shallow linguistic representations that figure prominently in
conservative learning models, such as the one proposed by Tomasello
(2000). Finally, because no overt marking of these abstract properties
is available in the primary linguistic data, children’s sensitivity to
6 A reviewer points out that our interpretation of the results fails to take
into account that children rejected the target sentence 20% of the time. We
would point out that of the 14 cases of acceptance, in 7 cases children’s explana-
tions suggested they were failing to assign a relative clause structure. For in-
stance, children sometimes rejected (23) by saying that in the story it had not
been established whether Pooh could lift the honey or the doughnut. In our
view, this kind of response could arguably be excluded. If so, then the rate of
acceptance would be 89% (56/63).
7 Recall that children in Crain et al.’s study accepted sentences like The
girl who didn’t go to sleep will get a dime or a jewel 87% of the time.
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abstract properties such as c-command adds to the nativist’s arguments
from the poverty of the stimulus.
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